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Abstract 
Generalized Signcryption is a fresh cryptographic primitive that not only can obtain encryption and signature in a 
single operation, but also provide encryption or signature model alone when needed. This paper proposed a formal 
definition of certificateless generalized signcryption(CLGSC), then provide the security model of CLGSC. A 
concrete CLGSC scheme is also given in this paper.  
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1.Introduction 
Signcryption is a cryptographic primitive proposed by Zheng in 1997 that could obtain encryption and 
signature in a single operation, which is more efficient than the traditional signature-then-encryption [1]. 
Since then, many schemes of signcryption are proposed. Malone-Lee gave the first identity based 
signcryption scheme in 2002[2], following which several other identity based signcryption schemes were 
proposed.  
Since the key escrow property of identity based cryptosystems is inherent, to avoid this problem, Al-
Riyami and Paterson proposed a new cryptographic primitive as certificateless public key system [3]. The 
keys are computed by the KGC and the users themselves, which eliminates the key escrow 
problem in identity based system and cumbersome certificate management problem in traditional public 
key system. Many certificateless signature and encryption schemes are provided. The first certificateless 
signcryption scheme was given by M.Barbosa and P.Farshim in 2003[4], several other certificateless 
signcryption schemes were proposed since then.  
The notion of generalized signcryption was termed by Han Yiliang and Yang Xiaoyuan in 2006[5]. The 
generalized signcryption. Wang Xu-an el al gave the formal security model for generalized signcryption 
and improved the scheme in [5] [6]. The first ID-based version is proposed by S. Lal and P. Kushwah[7].  
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 In this paper, we first propose the formal definition of the certificateless generalized 
signcryption(CLGSC), then the security notion of CLGSC is also presented. A new CLGSC scheme is 
 
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we give the definition of bilinear pairing and 
related computational hard problem; the formal definition and the security model of CLGSC are proposed 
in section 3. In section 4 we give a concrete CLGSC. The correctness and security is analyzed in section 5. 
Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2.Preliminaries 
In this section, we briefly give the definition of bilinear pairings and complexity assumption related to 
the security proof of our scheme. 
2.1.Bilinear Pairings 
Let G1 and G2 be two cyclic groups of prime order p and P be a random generator of G1. The map e: 
G1 ×G1 G2 is called an admissible bilinear pairing if the following conditions hold true. 
 e is bilinear, i.e. e(aP, bP) = e(P, P)ab for all a, b  Zp; 
 e is non-degenerate, i.e. e(P, P)  1
2G
; 
 e is efficiently computable. 
2.2.Complexity assumption 
GBDH (gap bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption) Given two cyclic groups G1 and G2 and map e: G1 
×G1 G2 defined as above, the gap bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption holds if the advantage of any PPT 
adversary as defined below is negligible. 
AdvGBDH(A,qDBDH) = Pr[T = e(P,P)abc| a, b, c  Zp; T = AO(aP, bP, cP)], 
Here O denotes a decision bilinear Diffie-Hellman pracle which on input a tuple (aP, bP, cP, T) 
outputs 1 if T = e(P, P)abc and 0 otherwise. By qDBDH we denote the maximum number of queries that A 
asks its decision oracle. 
CDHP (Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption) Given two cyclic groups G1 and G2 and map e: G1 
×G1 G2 defined as above, the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption holds in G1 if the advantage of 
any PPT adversary as defined below is negligible. 
AdvGDH (A) = Pr[Q = abP| a, b  Zp; Q = A (aP, bP)]. 
GDH P Given two cyclic groups G1 and G2 and map e: G1 ×G1 G2 defined as above, the 
computational Diffie-Hellman assumption in the presence of a decision bilinear Diffie-Hellman oracle 
holds in G1 if the advantage of any PPT adversary as defined below is negligible. 
AdvGDH (A,qDBDH) = Pr[Q = abP| a, b  Zp; Q = AO(aP, bP)] 
Here O and qDBDH are as in the above definition. 
3.Formal model and security notion of CLGSC 
In this section, we propose the formal definition of CLGSC and the security model of CLGSC.  
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3.1.Certificateless Generalized Signcryption  
A certificateless generalized signcryption scheme is defined by the following five probabilistic 
polynomial-time algorithms.  
 Setup (1k): Given a security parameter k, PKG executes this algorithm and generates a master key 
S and global parameters params. PKG publishes params and keep S secret. 
 Extract-Partial-Private-Key(ID, S, params). Given a user identity ID, PKG runs the algorithm and 
returns a partial private key D. 
 Set-User-Key (ID, D, params). Given a user ID, partial private key D and params, user runs the 
algorithm and returns a public key of the identity PK, and a secret key x, the private key of the user 
is (x, D). 
 GSC. This algorithm has 3 scenarios: signcryption, signature and encryption. 
Signcryption: if user A transmits a message m confidentially and authenticately to B, the input is 
(SA, m, IDB), and outputs ( , , )A BGSC S m ID . 
Signature: if user A wants to sign a message m without definite receiver, the input is (SA, m, ID ), 
where ID  means the receiver is null, the output is ( , , )AGSC S m ID . 
Encryption: if someone wants to send message m to B confidentially, the input is (S , m, IDB), 
where S  denotes the private key corresponding to ID . The output is ( , , )BGSC S m ID . 
 UGSC. Given , if it is valid, the receiver B unsigncrypts the ciphertext and returns m and (or) the 
signature on m by A, otherwise return means fail. 
3.2.Security Model of CLGSC 
Now we describe the security model for certificateless generalized signcryption under the inside 
attacker.  In confidentiality and unforgeability game we provide access to the following oracles: 
 Extract Partial Private Key: given an identity ID, the oracle returns the partial private key D using 
the Extract-Partial-Private-Key algorithm. 
 Extract Secret Key: given an identity ID, the oracle returns the full secret key SK=(x, D) of ID 
using the Set-User-Key algorithm. 
 Request Public Key: given an identity ID, the oracle returns the public key PK of ID using the Set-
User-Key algorithm. 
 Replace Public Key: given an identity ID and a valid public key PK , this oracle replace the public 
key of ID with PK  If the identity s public key  exist, then it is obtained through the Set-user-key 
algorithm and then replaced by PK  
 GSC oracle: given a massage m, a sender identity A, a receiver identity B, this oracle returns the 
result of running algorithm GSC. Note that if A and B are not empty, then use the Signcryption model; if A 
is empty,  use the encryption model; if B is empty, use the signature model. When the identity A isn t 
empty, and its  private key doesn t exist, first runs the Set-user-key algorithm to get A s full secret key and 
then runs algorithm GSC.  
 UGSC oracle: given a ciphertext, sender identity A, a receiver identity B, the oracle returns the 
result of running UGSC algorithm. 
As in many certificateless cryptosystems, we consider two types adversary, Type-I and Type-II 
adversary in the security definition of CLGSC. Roughly, the Type-I adversary models a common user 
without the master secret key, while the Type-II adversary models the honest but curious KGC.  
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Type-I adversary: since a Type-I adversary is a common user, he is allowed to request the above 6 
oracles with the following constraint: 
 Adversary is not allowed to request the master secret key; 
 Adversary is not allowed to request the extract partial private key of the challenge identities if its 
public key has been replaced. 
Type-II adversary: a Type-II adversary is an honest but curious KGC, so he is given the master secret 
key, he is allowed to request the above 6 oracles with the following constraint: 
 No extract secret key query is allowed on the challenge identities. 
 No replace public key query is allowed on the challenge identities before the challenge phase. 
Confidentiality 
 Definition 1: A certificateless generalized signcryption is called IND-CLGSC-iCCA2 secure if every 
of the probabilistic polynomial time Type-I or Type-II adversary has negligible advantage in winning the 
following game between the challenger C and the adversary A: 
Setup: Challenger C runs the setup algorithm to generate master key Msk and system parameters 
Params. C gives A Params while keeping Msk secret (C gives the Msk to A when A is a Type-II 
adversary). After receiving Params, A outputs a target identity ID*. C interacts with A in following phases: 
Phase 1: A is given access to the above all the six oracles. A adaptively queries the oracles consistent 
with the constraints described above.  
Challenge: A outputs two message m0, m1, and a sender s identity IDS, C randomly chooses a bit b R 
{0,1}and computes a generalized signcryption * = GSC(mb, IDS, SKS, PKS, ID*, PK*) and sends * to A. 
Phase 2: A makes the same queries as in phase, besides it cannot query UGSC oracle on * for ID*. 
Guess: A output its guess b  on b at the end of the game. If b  = b, A wins the game. The advantage of 
A is defined as AdvAIND-CLGSC-iCCA2=|2Pr[b = b ]-1|. 
Authenticity 
Definition 2: A certificateless generalized signcryption is called xistential unforgeability (EUF-
CLGSC-iCMA) if every of the probabilistic polynomial time Type-I or Type-II adversary has negligible 
advantage in winning the following game between the challenger C and the adversary F: 
Setup: Challenger C runs the setup algorithm to generate master key Msk and system parameters 
Params. C gives F Params while keeping Msk secret (C gives the Msk to A when A is a Type-II 
adversary). After receiving Params, F outputs target identity ID*. C interacts with F in following phases: 
Phase 1: F is given access to the above all the six oracles. F makes the same queries as in the game 
above. 
Forgery:  F output a signature * and a receiver IDR, we assume that IDR  ID*. If UGSC( *, SR, IDR), 
returns m and * was not the output of any GSC query GSC(m, ID*, IDR), then F wins the game. The 
probability that F wins the game is defined as AdvAEUF-CLGSC-iCMA. 
4.A concrete scheme of CLGSC 
We proposed a certificateless generalized signcryption scheme based on M.Barbosa, P.Farshim s work 
in [4], which is generalized as follows. 
Setup(1k):  given a security parameter 1k, the KGC chooses two groups G1 and G2 of prime order p, 
two random generator P, Q of G1 such that P Q, and a bilinear map e: G1 ×G1 G2. Compute g = e(P, 
Q) G2, define 5 hash functions as H1:{0,1}* G1,  H2:{0,1}* {0,1}k, H3: {0,1}* G1, H4: {0,1}* G1, 
where k denotes the number of bits to represent a message. KGC chooses random s  Zp* as master secret 
key and set Ppub = sP. KGC publishes the system parameters as < G1, G2, P, Ppub, e: G1 ×G1 G2, H1 , H2 , 
H3 , H4 >. 
Extract-Partial-Private-Key: given IDi, the partial private key of the user with identity IDi is 
computed by KGC as Di = sQi = sH1 (IDi). 
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Set-User-Key: given Di, the user with identity IDi chooses random xi  Zp* and sets his private key SKi 
=< xi, Di > and public key PKi = xi P. 
GSC: This algorithm has 3 scenarios: signcryption, signature and encryption. 
Signcryption: given message m, sender  identity A, receiver s identity B, A operates the following 
steps: 
1 A chooses random r  Zp*, computes U = rP, w = e (Ppub, QB)r; 
2 computes h = H2(U, w, rPKB, IDB, PKB); 
3 computes V = m h; 
4 computes H = H3(U, V, IDA, PKA); 
5 computes H  = H4(U, V, IDA, PKA); 
6 compute W = DA+rH+xAH ; 
7 return ciphertext c = (U, V, W). 
Signature: given message m, sender  identity A, A operates the following steps: 
1 A chooses random r  Zp*, computes U = rP, w =1; 
2 computes h =0; 
3 computes V = m h = m; 
4 computes H = H3(U, V, IDA, PKA); 
5 computes H  = H4(U, V, IDA, PKA); 
6 compute W = DA+rH+xAH ; 
7 return ciphertext c = (U, V, W). 
Encryption: given message m, receiver s identity B, someone operates the following steps: 
1 A chooses random r  Zp*, computes U = rP, w = e (Ppub, QB)r; 
2 computes h = H2(U, w, rPKB, IDB, PKB); 
3 computes V = m h; 
4 computes W =0; 
5 return ciphertext c = (U, V, W). 
UCLGSC: given c, a receiver s identity B, operates the following steps: 
1 if W  0; computes H = H3(U, V, IDA, PKA)and H  = H3(U, V, IDA, PKA); 
2 if e (P, W) e (Ppub, QA) e (U, H) e (PKA, H ) when W  0, return ; 
3 computes w = e (U, DB) (if the receiver s identity is empty, then w = e (U, 0) = 1);  
4 computes h = H2(U, w, xBU, IDB, PKB) (if the receiver s identity is empty, then h = 1); 
5 computes m = V h; 
6 returns m. 
Note that in UGSC algorithm, the pairing e (Ppub, QA) can be precomputed. 
5.Correctness and Security analysis 
In this section, we analyze the correctness and security of our scheme. 
5.1.Correctness 
The correctness of our CLGSC scheme is below:  
If W  0, then e(P, W)= e(P, DA+rH+xAH ) = e(P, DA) e(P, rH) e(P, xAH ) = e(sP, QA) e(rP, H) e(xAP, 
H ) = e(Ppub, QA) e(U, H) e(PKA, H ). 
5.2.Security analysis  
Theorem 1 The certificateless generalized signcryption scheme above is IND-iCCA-I/II secure in the 
random oracle model under the assumption that the GBDHP is intractable in the underlying bilinear group.  
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Theorem 2 The certificateless generalized signcryption scheme above is sUF-iCMA-I/II secure in the 
random oracle model under the assumption that the GDH  is intractable in G1.  
The proof of the above theorems is similar to that in paper [4]. 
6.Conclusion 
In this paper, we defined the formal notion of CLGSC, in which a special  signcryption scheme could 
also be used as signature and encryption scheme. We modified the security model for certificateless 
signcryption scheme in [4] to adapt for our CLGSC scheme. The confidentiality and unforgeability have 
been formally defined in our security model. We proposed a concrete CLGSC scheme based on the CLSC 
scheme in [4]. The security proof of our scheme is similar to that of the CLSC scheme in [4].  
Since the usefulness of generalized signcryption in real environment, in our future work, we intend to 
construct more efficient CLGSC schemes secure in random model and without random model. 
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